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MY CREDITOR’S KEEPER:  
ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT AND 
CUSTODIAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES  
IN THE VICINITY OF INSOLVENCY 
AMIR N. LICHT* 
ABSTRACT 
Fiduciary duties in the vicinity of insolvency form a notoriously murky 
area where legal space warps. Courts openly acknowledge that it is difficult 
to identify its boundaries, and the content of these duties is equally 
uncertain and inconsistent across jurisdictions. This Article expands the 
theoretical basis for a special legal regime in virtually or liminally insolvent 
firms. In addition to the conventional rationale of opportunistic risk shifting, 
lawmakers should be mindful of managers’ tendency to unjustifiably 
continue failing projects, known as escalation of commitment. Second, this 
Article addresses the substantive content of a duty to protect creditors, 
either as in the form of a duty to consider creditors’ interest or as the 
statutory rule against wrongful (or insolvent, or reckless) trading. 
Specifically, it argues that when these duties are enlivened at the very edge 
of the zone of insolvency, the mission of directors should transform from 
entrepreneurial to custodial and should include a trustee-like duty of 
caution.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In several common law systems, creditors of corporate debtors enjoy 
legal protections beyond what their contracts with those companies afford 
them. These protections cover both large and small creditors, voluntary and 
involuntary creditors alike. These protections derive from duties imposed 
on directors and other corporate fiduciaries by common law or by statute 
that call for considering and sometimes promoting creditors’ interests 
before the latter take over the company through formal bankruptcy 
proceedings. This stage is metaphorically described as the “vicinity” or 
“zone of insolvency.” 
The vicinity-of-insolvency duties form a notoriously murky area where 
legal space warps. The contours of this area are fuzzy. Courts openly 
acknowledge that it is difficult to identify clear guideposts for the threshold 
at which these duties are enlivened. The content of these duties is equally 
uncertain and conceptually inconsistent across jurisdictions. At one end of 
the spectrum, Delaware law denies the legal existence of a zone of 
insolvency, thus relieving itself—and purportedly, also directors—of the 
need to consider creditors’ interests outside of insolvency. At the other end, 
Canadian law locates shareholders’ and creditors’ interests at the same 
level, assigning neither priority a priori. In this view, creditors constitute 
one stakeholder constituency among several, including shareholders and 
employees, whose interests directors should balance. Somewhere in a 
notional middle ground, the laws of countries like the United Kingdom and 
Australia struggle to give concrete content to the duty to consider creditors’ 













The goal of this Article is two-fold. First, it expands the theoretical basis 
for a special legal regime in virtually insolvent or liminally insolvent firms. 
To explain and justify special fiduciary duties to consider creditors’ 
interests, lawyers usually point to the danger of opportunistic high-risk 
behavior by managers on behalf of shareholders. I argue that this account 
may be sound but is nonetheless lacking. In addition to such opportunism, 
lawmakers should also be mindful of managers’ tendency to unjustifiably 
continue failing projects—a practice known as escalation of commitment. 
Unlike opportunistic risk shifting, for which empirical evidence is 
surprisingly sparse, escalation of commitment is an irrational behavior that 
has been widely documented and studied but has been largely neglected by 
legal scholars.  
Second, this Article addresses the substantive content of the duty to 
protect creditors where such duties are recognized, either in the form of a 
duty to consider creditors’ interest or as the statutory rule against wrongful 
(or insolvent, or reckless) trading. I maintain that when these duties are 
enlivened—arguably, at the very edge of the zone of insolvency, close to 
actual insolvency—the mission of directors should transform from 
entrepreneurial to custodial. That is, they should implement strategies that 
aim to preserve the firm—in working condition, to the extent possible, with 
a view to resuming regular business—but avoid seeking new projects with 
a view toward maximizing profits. This could mean that the shield of the 
business judgment rule may not be available to the same extent as in regular 
circumstances. The Covid-19 pandemic that swept the globe in 2020 
provides a fresh context for this approach and underscores the need to 
implement such a regime sensibly, with high deference to business 
decisions even if outside the scope of the business judgment rule. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the role of creditors as 
corporate stakeholders and its legal implications for directors’ duties to 
promote the company’s interests. Next, it briefly reviews the problem of 
anti-creditor opportunism and presents the possibly bigger problem of 
escalation of commitment. Part II sets forth the custodial duties in the 
vicinity of insolvency. Part III provides a comparative analysis of creditor-
oriented duties in several common law jurisdictions and examines how these 
jurisdictions could implement a custodial approach. Part IV concludes. 
I. CREDITORS AS AN ENDANGERED SPECIES 
The common wisdom in corporate finance and corporate law points to 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors and notes that the 
latter are vulnerable to abuse by the former. These tensions are often 












described as an “agency problem,” and the resulting losses are sometimes 
called “agency costs of debt.” These are misnomers, however. Unlike 
managers, who are agents for the company and indirectly for shareholders, 
shareholders do not stand in the same position vis-à-vis creditors as agents 
or fiduciaries of the latter.1 There is no mission or project that creditors 
entrust to shareholders, and shareholder-appointed managers do not work 
for or on behalf of creditors. It is more accurate therefore to refer to 
“opportunistic behavior” by shareholders through company managers and 
to the detriment of creditors in the Williamsonian sense—namely, by 
exploiting transaction costs of contract formation, information asymmetry, 
vulnerability due to specific investment, etc.2 
To see the source of creditors’ vulnerability, consider a basic setting, in 
which shareholders appoint managers to operate the firm for profit and 
enjoy limited liability such that creditors have recourse only to the 
company’s assets, the company being a separate legal entity.3 This setting 
assumes that only property law and contract law apply (i.e., no fiduciary 
duties); the shareholder-manager agency problem is assumed away for 
convenience.4 Several mechanisms could then be utilized to make creditors 
bear non-priced business risk after the credit terms—particularly, the 
interest rate—have been set. Assuming that higher business risk is 
accompanied by higher expected returns, when the company is virtually 
insolvent shareholders enjoy the upside of increased risk without being fully 
exposed to its downside, which is borne by the creditors. 
The literature identifies three major risk-shifting mechanisms: asset 
dilution, claim dilution, and asset substitution. 5  Asset dilution involves 
siphoning value away from the company, either legitimately (e.g., through 
 
1. Nota bene: with regard to creditors’ interest and not, or not necessarily, to creditors directly. 
In line with standard legal convention, I take directors’ duties to be owed to the corporation. 
2. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS 47–48 (1975); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 26–27 (1985); see also Armen A. Alchian & Susan 
Woodward, The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson’s The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 65 (1988). 
3. The following draws mainly on Smith and Warner’s seminal article. Clifford W. Smith & 
Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 
(1979). See also the obligatory Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). For a 
summary, see John Armour, Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Transactions with Creditors, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 109–43 (3d ed. 2017).  
4. In a more skeletal setting, an individual takes debt from creditors. The debtor-creditor 
opportunism analysis is similar, but we are here interested in director duties. 
5. The terminology for each of these mechanisms varies in different accounts but the different 
labels mean the same thing for each mechanism. Some authors distinguish additional mechanisms—for 













dividend payouts) or illegitimately (e.g., through self-dealing, also known 
as “tunneling”). 6  When creditors seize a company upon default and 
insolvency, the remaining assets do not match the risk they bargained for. 
Claim dilution works similarly to diminish the scope of the collateral 
available to creditors upon default, but instead of depleting the company’s 
assets it increases its liabilities by taking on more debt—again, beyond what 
the creditors have envisaged and priced. Finally, asset substitution stands 
for post hoc changes in the firm’s line of business—specifically, by entering 
into higher-risk-higher-return projects. In the now-less-likely event that 
those projects succeed, shareholders will garner the higher rewards, while 
creditors become more likely to end up with whatever scraps that remain in 
the company upon liquidation. 
The effect of all of these mechanisms is the same—namely, exploitation 
and frustration. However, because risk shifting as described above is rather 
straightforward, most creditors realize its prospects and take measures to 
hedge against it by adjusting credit terms. There is ample evidence that, 
beyond setting interest rates in line with foreseeable risks, resourceful 
creditors design loan contracts (debentures) to accommodate particularly 
pertinent risks with appropriate covenants, security interests, and so forth.7 
Moreover, participants in certain debt markets appear to identify and price 
such covenants and penalize corporate debtors for breaching these 
obligations, thus providing incentives for optimal contracting and 
compliance.8  In fact, there is surprisingly little evidence that corporate 
debtors can successfully engage in opportunistic risk shifting to extract 
value from creditors. The available empirical evidence relates largely to 
publicly traded debt instruments. While there is evidence for increased risk 
taking,9 evidence for risk shifting is sparse. Such risk shifting appears to 
 
6. See Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
Tunneling, AM. ECON. REV., May 2020, at 22; Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. 
Ciccotello, Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1 (2011); see also Kristin van Zwieten, Director Liability 
in Insolvency and Its Vicinity, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 382, 385 (2018) (in a review of U.K. cases, 
finding that actions based on a duty to consider creditors have served as a substitute for a preference—
i.e., “tunneling”—action). 
7. See Smith & Warner, supra note 3; see also George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The 
Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073 (1995). For a recent study 
see, for example, Barry E. Adler & Vedran Capkun, Debt-Equity Conflict and the Incidence of Secured 
Credit, 62 J. L. & ECON. 551 (2019). 
8. See John R. Graham, Si Li & Jiaping Qiu, Corporate Misreporting and Bank Loan 
Contracting, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 44 (2008). 
9. See, e.g., Giovanni Favara, Erwan Morellec, Enrique Schroth & Philip Valta, Debt 
Enforcement, Investment, and Risk Taking Across Countries, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 22 (2017); Anna N. 
Danielova, Sudipto Sarkar & Gwangheon Hong, Empirical Evidence on Corporate Risk-Shifting, 48 
FIN. REV. 443 (2013). 












take place only in limited circumstances.10 In summary, while risk shifting 
may not be a myth, its actual severity is unclear at this stage. 
The persuasive power of the risk-shifting account is so compelling that 
lawyers have bought whole-heartedly into it. This is especially the case as 
firms engage in unbridled asset substitution by embarking on high risk 
projects and claim dilution by taking on new debt, possibly because illicit 
asset dilution is covered by a battery of legal doctrines against self-dealing 
and fraudulent conveyances.11 Paul Davies thus opined:  
[O]nce the shareholders’ equity has been dissipated, or has been 
reduced to a very low level, and there is no prospect of its being 
rebuilt through the company’s established business model, the 
incentive for company controllers (if acting in the shareholder 
interest) is to take on excessively risky projects, for their attention 
can focus exclusively on the potential upside of decisions.12 
Authors writing from both common-law and civil-law perspectives share 
this view.13 In Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Ltd. v. Mei, Gummow, 
 
10. For financial economic studies finding no or very limited evidence for effective (i.e., abusive) 
risk shifting, see Kevin Aretz, Shantanu Banerjee & Oksana Pryshchepa, In the Path of the Storm: Does 
Distress Risk Cause Industrial Firms to Risk-Shift?, 23 REV. FIN. 1115 (2019); Pablo Hernández-Lagos, 
Paul Povel & Giorgo Sertsios, An Experimental Analysis of Risk-Shifting Behavior, 6 REV. CORP. FIN. 
STUD. 68 (2017); Erik P. Gilje, Do Firms Engage in Risk-Shifting? Empirical Evidence, 29 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2925 (2016); Oksana Pryshchepa, Kevin Aretz & Shantanu Banerjee, Can Investors Restrict 
Managerial Investment Behavior in Distressed Firms?, 23 J. CORP. FIN. 222 (2013); Assaf Eisdorfer, 
Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms, 63 J. FIN. 609 (2008); B. Espen 
Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions, 
69 J. FIN. ECON. 227 (2003); Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not 
Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 J. FIN. 
1443 (1998). For evidence in line with risk shifting, see Keming Li, Jimmy Lockwood & Hong Miao, 
Risk-Shifting, Equity Risk, and the Distress Puzzle, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 275 (2017). For surveys finding 
little support for the risk-shifting account, see John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and 
Practice of Corporate Finance: Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (2001); Abe de Jong & 
Ronald van Dijk, Determinants of Leverage and Agency Problems: A Regression Approach with Survey 
Data, 13 EUR. J. FIN. 565 (2007); see also Itzhak Ben-David, Ajay A. Palvia & René M. Stulz, How 
Important Is Moral Hazard for Distressed Banks? (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper 
No. 681, 2020) (finding that financially distressed banks reduce their leverage and decrease observable 
measures of riskiness, which is inconsistent with the view that moral hazard incentives would motivate 
them to take advantage of the bank safety net). 
11. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977). 
12. Paul Davies, Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken 
in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 301, 306 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
13. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
223, 230 (1991); Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 575, 576–577 (1995); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 901, 909 (1986); Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian 
Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors, 66 MOD. L. REV. 665, 675 (2003); 













Non-Permanent Judge (formerly a Justice of the High Court of Australia), 
writing for the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, also adopted Davies’s 
analysis.14 
As empirical evidence on risk shifting is starting to accumulate, some 
legal authors have also begun to pay attention to the empirical challenge and 
note that that evidence does not fully support the risk-shifting account as a 
major source of concern.15 In tandem, there also seems to be a consensus 
that small and involuntary creditors—in particular, trade and tort creditors, 
respectively—cannot fully hedge against risk shifting and thus remain 
vulnerable to shareholder opportunism. 16  These modes of shareholder 
opportunism are less amenable to rigorous empirical testing by financial 
economists.  
II. ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT 
When a project that has consumed substantial resources fails to deliver 
or to progress as planned, its managers face a dilemma: should they invest 
additional resources in the hope that it reaches fruition or should they 
discontinue it and declare failure? Continuing a struggling project could 
reflect perseverance, resolution, and determination—sticking to one’s 
guns—but it could also stem from managerial failure to face reality and act 
on current information, sticking one’s head in the sand. Managers and 
shareholders of companies in the vicinity of insolvency face precisely this 
type of dilemma. 
As noted in the preceding section, the legal discourse on creditors as 
corporate stakeholders focuses on risk shifting such that legal policy is 
guided by basic economic theory, common sense, and mostly anecdotal 
evidence. This section aims to enrich the analytical framework by pointing 
to escalation of commitment as a potent factor in the dynamics of business. 
 
Proceedings, Workouts and the Incentives for Shareholders/Managers, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 239, 
243 (2006); Gerald Spindler, Trading in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 339, 340 
(2006); Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, The Avoidance of Pre-Bankruptcy Transactions: An Economic and 
Comparative Approach, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 711, 726 (2018). 
14. Moulin Glob. Eyecare Holdings v. Lee Sin Mei [2014] 17 H.K.C.F.A.R. 467, 487 para. 50 
(C.F.A.). 
15. Some authors have pointed out the empirical question. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 3, 
at 111 n.9; Gurrea-Martínez, supra note 13, at 726 n. 39 (citing Gilje, supra note 10); Aurelio Gurrea-
Martínez, Towards an Optimal Model of Directors’ Duties in the Zone of Insolvency: An Economic and 
Comparative Approach 7 n.15 (Sin. Mgmt. Univ. Sch. of L., Research Paper No. 22, 2020). 
16. For a few exceptions that have pointed the particular vulnerability of tort creditors in the 
general context of limited liability, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited 
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991). 












Escalation of commitment has been largely overlooked by legal scholars 
thus far, despite its pertinence to designing legal policy for the vicinity of 
insolvency.17 It is submitted that escalation of commitment poses an equal, 
if not greater, challenge than risk shifting does to optimal regulation of 
companies in looming or virtual insolvency. 
Escalation of commitment refers to a broad phenomenon, in which 
decision makers adhere to a failing project despite strong indications that it 
should be aborted. Introduced in a seminal 1976 article by Barry Staw,18 
escalation of commitment has since been studied in hundreds of articles.19 
It is primarily an individual-level phenomenon linked to personal attributes 
such as biases in decision making. But escalation of commitment also varies 
with context, including organizational context and societal-level factors. 
People tend to remain married to their original choices and to commit 
resources to them even when it is no longer rational for them to do so. 
Behavioral scientists have identified several psychological factors that 
influence this tendency.  The sunk cost fallacy is a prime factor. Although 
economic theory teaches that investment decisions should focus on future 
gains or losses, in actuality, people take non-recoupable past expenditure 
into account as a consideration for remaining invested or even continuing to 
invest rather than pulling the plug. Falling prey to the sunk cost fallacy has 
been related to personal motivation to avoid negative feelings associated 
with acknowledging failure and loss. 20  Camerer and Weber note that 
although escalation of commitment and the sunk cost fallacy are essentially 
 
17. See Hanjo Hamann, Unpacking the Board: A Comparative and Empirical Perspective on 
Groups in Corporate Decision-Making, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 45–46 (2014); Michael E. Murphy, 
Assuring Responsible Risk Management in Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 121, 155–56 (2011); Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions 
Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 619–20 (2013). 
18. Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen 
Course of Action, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 27 (1976) [hereinafter Staw 
1976]; see also Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action. 6 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 577 (1981). 
19. See, e.g., Dustin J. Sleesman, Donald E. Conlon, Gerry McNamara & Jonathan E. Miles, 
Cleaning up the Big Muddy: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Determinants of Escalation of Commitment, 
55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 541 (2012) [hereinafter Sleesman et al. 2012]; Dustin J. Sleesman, Anna C. Lennard, 
Gerry McNamara & Donald E. Conlon, Putting Escalation of Commitment in Context: A Multilevel 
Review and Analysis, 12 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 178 (2018) [hereinafter Sleesman et al. 2018]; see also 
Helga Drummond, Escalation of Commitment: When to Stay the Course?, 28 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPS. 
430 (2014). 
20. See Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985); Hal R. Arkes & Peter Ayton, The Sunk Cost and 
Concorde Effects: Are Humans Less Rational Than Lower Animals, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 591 (1999). More 
recently, see, for example, Gilad Feldman & Kin Fai Ellick Wong, When Action-Inaction Framing Leads 
to Higher Escalation of Commitment: A New Inaction-Effect Perspective on the Sunk-Cost Fallacy, 













the same phenomenon, escalation is broader, as forms of commitment other 
than previous economic expenditures could drive it—e.g., a verbal 
commitment.21  They empirically find that irrational escalation exerts an 
effect beyond the effects that are attributable to rational factors.22  Self-
justification is another factor that has been related to escalation of 
commitment. In this view, the need to protect one’s self-identity could 
motivate the person who made the original decision may to escalate.23 Self-
presentation theory offers a related factor, in that decision makers adhere to 
prior decisions notwithstanding negative information in order to avoid the 
embarrassment of admitting a mistake.24 More generally, people have been 
found to escalate in order to avoid the associated negative affect (bad 
feelings such as anger, regret, anxiety, etc.).25 Last but not least, rational, 
agency-type self-interestedness could also motivate escalation.26 
Escalation of commitment is ubiquitous. In addition to experimental 
settings, it has been observed and studied in organizations large and small, 
in business corporations and in the public sector. Importantly for the present 
context, owner-managers, family firms, and venture capital firms exhibit 
escalation of commitment when the firm is on the verge of failure. 
 
21. See Colin F. Camerer & Roberto A. Weber, The Econometrics and Behavioral Economics of 
Escalation of Commitment: A Re-Examination of Staw and Hoang’s NBA Data, 39 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 59, 60 n.1 (1999). 
22. Camerer & Weber, supra note 21, at 74. 
23. See Staw 1976, supra note 18; Joel Brockner, Robert Houser, Gregg Birnbaum, Kathy Lloyd, 
Janet Deitcher, Sinaia Nathanson & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Escalation of Commitment to an Ineffective Course 
of Action: The Effect of Feedback Having Negative Implications for Self-Identity, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
109 (1986); Joel Brockner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward 
Theoretical Progress, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 39 (1992). 
24. See Joel Brockner, Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Elaine Lang, Face-saving and Entrapment, 17 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 68 (1981). Sleesman et al. 2012, supra note 19, at 543, mentions several 
other individual-level accounts, which have gained lesser attention in subsequent research. 
25. See Kin Fai Ellick Wong, Michelle Yik & Jessica Y.Y. Kwong, Understanding the 
Emotional Aspects of Escalation of Commitment: The Role of Negative Affect, 91 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 
282 (2006); Kin Fai Ellick Wong & Jessica Y.Y. Kwong, The Role of Anticipated Regret in Escalation 
of Commitment, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 545 (2007); Ming-Hong Tsai & Maia J. Young, Anger, Fear, and 
Escalation of Commitment, 24 COGNITION & EMOTION 962 (2010); Alexander T. Jackson, Satoris S. 
Howes, Edgar E. Kausel, Michael E. Young & Megan E. Loftis, The Reciprocal Relationships Between 
Escalation, Anger, and Confidence in Investment Decisions Over Time, FRONTIERS PSYCH., July 5, 
2018, at 1, 8; Koen A. Dijkstra & Ying-yi Hong, The Feeling of Throwing Good Money After Bad: The 
Role of Affective Reaction in the Sunk-Cost Fallacy, PLOS ONE, Jan. 8, 2019; see also Henry Moon, John 
R. Hollenbeck, Stephen E. Humphrey & Brian Maue, The Tripartite Model of Neuroticism and the 
Suppression of Depression and Anxiety Within an Escalation of Commitment Dilemma, 71 J. 
PERSONALITY 347 (2003). On the role of affect in groups see Tori Y. Huang, Vangelis Souitaris & Sigal 
G. Barsade, Which Matters More? Group Fear Versus Hope in Entrepreneurial Escalation of 
Commitment, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1852 (2019). 
26. See Peter Booth & Axel K.-D. Schulz, The Impact of an Ethical Environment on Managers’ 
Project Evaluation Judgments Under Agency Problem Conditions, 29 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 473 
(2004).  












Considerations of personal and family pride exacerbate the tendency to 
escalate in these settings,27 and family owners in fact become more resolute 
in prolonging the life of their ailing firms.28 Entrepreneurs in particular have 
been shown to be prone to escalate.29 
Escalation of commitment is not only a personal irrational and emotional 
behavior; more often than not, it takes place in the broader social context of 
one’s in-group—in particular, the board of directors, the organization, and 
one’s community and culture. A growing body of research documents 
escalation-related effects of these social contexts. Several studies have 
shown that for various reasons, boards of directors tend to get trapped in 
group dynamics that lead to escalation of commitment to failing projects.30 
Theory suggests that a higher proportion of qualified outside directors could 
help firms to de-escalate, especially in family firms, as these directors may 
be less prone to commitment. 31  The evidence, however, indicates that 
 
27. See Dean A. Shepherd, Johan Wiklund & J. Michael Haynie, Moving Forward: Balancing 
the Financial and Emotional Costs of Business Failure, 24 J. BUS. VENTURING 134, 138 (2009); Jeremy 
A. Woods, Thomas Dalziel & Sidney L. Barton, Escalation of Commitment in Private Family 
Businesses: The Influence of Outside Board Members, 3 J. FAM. BUS. STRATEGY 18 (2012); Naveed 
Akhter, Philipp Sieger & Francesco Chirico, If We Can’t Have It, Then No One Should: Shutting Down 
Versus Selling in Family Business Portfolios, 10 STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 371 (2016). On 
venture capital firms see David Devigne, Sophie Manigart & Mike Wright, Escalation of Commitment 
in Venture Capital Decision Making: Differentiating Between Domestic and International Investors, 31 
J. BUS. VENTURING 253 (2016). 
28. See Francesco Chirico, Luis R. Gómez-Mejia, Karin Hellerstedt, Michael Withers & Mattias 
Nordqvist, To Merge, Sell, or Liquidate? Socioemotional Wealth, Family Control, and the Choice of 
Business Exit, 46 J. MGMT. 1342 (2020). 
29. See Thomas  Åstebro, Scott A. Jeffrey & Gordon K. Adomdza, Inventor Perseverance After 
Being Told to Quit: The Role of Cognitive Biases, 20 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 253 (2007); Robert 
A. Lowe & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Overoptimism and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Firms, 52 
MGMT. SCI. 173 (2006); Anne M. McCarthy, F. David Schoorman & Arnold C. Cooper, Reinvestment 
Decisions by Entrepreneurs: Rational Decision-Making or Escalation of Commitment?, 8 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 9 (1993). These tendencies are consistent with evidence that entrepreneurs are prone to 
overestimating their innate abilities and to underestimating external risk factors and are also especially 
sensitive to non-pecuniary incentives. See Thomas Åstebro, Holger Herz, Ramana Nanda & Roberto A. 
Weber, Seeking the Roots of Entrepreneurship: Insights from Behavioral Economics, 28 J. ECON. 
PERSPS. 49 (2014); Sari Pekkala Kerr, William R. Kerr & Tina Xu, Personality Traits of Entrepreneurs: 
A Review of Recent Literature, 14 FOUNDS. & TRENDS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP 279 (2018). 
30. See, e.g., James D. Westphal & Michael K. Bednar, Pluralistic Ignorance in Corporate 
Boards and Firms’ Strategic Persistence in Response to Low Firm Performance, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 262 
(2005); Henry Moon, Donald E. Conlon, Stephen E. Humphrey, Narda Quigley, Cynthia E. Devers & 
Jaclyn M. Nowakowski, Group Decision Process and Incrementalism in Organizational Decision 
Making, 92 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 67 (2003); Sun Hyun Park, James 
D. Westphal & Ithai Stern, Set Up for a Fall: The Insidious Effects of Flattery and Opinion Conformity 
Toward Corporate Leaders, 56 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 257 (2011). More generally, diverse views within the 
board could be quelled by powerful managers. See Leigh Plunkett Tost, Francesca Gino & Richard P. 
Larrick, When Power Makes Others Speechless: The Negative Impact of Leader Power on Team 
Performance, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1465 (2013). 
31. See Woods et al., supra note 27, at 19–20, 24; Ann K. Buchholtz, Michael Lubatkin & Hugh 













outside directors may not be effective in reducing escalation pressures.32 
Having decisions made by groups (rather than by individual managers) or 
increasing the diversity of decision-making teams alone does not appear to 
avoid escalation traps.33  
From a comparative perspective, escalation of commitment varies across 
cultures. Because it is anchored in individual behavioral tendencies and in 
societal situational conditions, one should expect that cultural stances 
should moderate (that is, to either enhance or attenuate) the intensity of 
escalation. Cultural values provide implicit guidance about accepted and 
expected behavior that could enhance or inhibit individual tendencies. 
Cross-cultural analyses usually examine such variation along cultural 
dimensions—namely, fundamental themes about which cultures have 
different stances that can be measured and compared in dimensional 
models.34  
Salter and his colleagues tested the effects of agency and self-
justification theories on escalation of commitment in a sample of managers 
from nine countries (Canada, China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Singapore and the United States).35 Using Hofstede’s dimensional 
model,36 these authors observe that cultural individualism intensifies the 
effect of agency on escalation behavior such that escalation is more likely 
to occur in high-individualism countries.37 This, in turn, suggests a need for 
 
32. See Westphal & Bednar, supra note 30, at 287. Outside directors might actually increase 
conformity in the board in certain circumstances. See generally Park et al., supra note 30. 
33. See Sleesman et al. 2018, supra note 19, at 183. 
34. See Shalom H. Schwartz, National Culture as Value Orientations: Consequences of Value 
Differences and Cultural Distance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE 547 
(Victor A. Ginsburgh & David Throsby eds., 2014). For a concise introduction to cross-cultural analysis 
of corporate governance, see Amir N. Licht, Culture and Law in Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 129 (Jeffery N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 
2018) (hereinafter Licht 2018); see also Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward 
a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2001). 
35. See Stephen B. Salter, David J. Sharp & Yasheng Chen, The Moderating Effects of National 
Culture on Escalation of Commitment, 29 ADVANCES ACCT. 161 (2013). For related prior studies see 
David J. Sharp & Stephen B. Salter, Project Escalation and Sunk Costs: A Test of the International 
Generalizability of Agency and Prospect Theories, 28 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 101 (1997); Stephen B. Salter 
& David J. Sharp, Agency Effects and Escalation of Commitment: Do Small National Culture 
Differences Matter?, 36 INT’L J. ACCT. 33 (2001); Stephen B. Salter, Philip A. Lewis & Luis Felipe 
Juárez Valdes, Aqui No Se Habla Agencia. An Examination of the Impact of Adverse Selection and 
Framing in Decision-Making: A US/Mexico Comparison, 15 J. INT’L FIN. MGMT. ACCT. 93 (2004); see 
also Paul D. Harrison, Chee W. Chow, Anne Wu & Adrian M. Harrell, A Cross-Cultural Investigation 
of Managers’ Project Evaluation Decisions, 11 BEHAV. RSCH. ACCT. 143 (1999). 
36. See GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS (2d ed. 2001). 
37. Hofstede’s cultural individualism stands for valuing loosely knit social relations, in which 
individuals are expected to care only for themselves and their immediate families, in contrast with 












stronger risk management systems in locations and organizations that are 
characterized by individualism.38  
In the present context, the extant evidence on individualism suggests 
that, in the latter, individualistic, countries, there could be a more pressing 
need and justification for legal intervention to thwart escalation in 
financially distressed companies. In this view, for instance, highly 
individualistic countries such as the United States would do better to reject 
rather than embrace Debtor-in-Possession (“DIP”) arrangements, in which 
incumbent managements of insolvent firms remain at the helm throughout 
bankruptcies. In contrast, lower-individualism countries could implement 
DIP arrangements with lesser fear that they would be exploited by 
incumbent managers to escalate—even if unconsciously—until their firms 
collapse. As a matter of practice, however, non-English-speaking Western 
European (read: European) countries score lower on Hofstede’s 
individualism than English-speaking ones, but these differences are modest 
in comparison to non-Western (read: Asian) countries. This suggests that 
one need not exaggerate the putative effects of cultural differences in 
connection with designing legal policy in light of this factor. 
Salter and his coauthors also found that managers in long-term-oriented 
countries39—typically, East Asian countries—are more likely to escalate 
projects with long-term consequences than those with only short-term 
effects. A study by other researchers found that Chinese managers have a 
greater preference to continue unprofitable projects than their U.S. 
counterparts due to greater aversion to admitting failure in a collectivist 
culture and thereby losing face. 40  In addition, there are inconclusive 
 
cultural collectivism, which connotes tightly knit relations, in which people can expect their wider in-
group (e.g., extended family or clan) to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 
38. English-speaking countries, and especially the United States, tend to rank higher on 
Hofstede’s individualism. See HOFSTEDE, supra note 36, at 215. I abstract here from the issues of using 
countries as proxies for cultures and of grouping countries into cultural regions. For discussions, see 
Licht 2018, supra note 34; Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, Tatiana Kostova & Kendall Roth, Commentary, An 
Overview of Hofstede-Inspired Country-Level Culture Research in International Business Since 2006, 
48 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 30 (2017).  
39. Hofstede’s long-term orientation dimension refers to a dynamic, future-oriented culture that 
emphasizes values like persistence (perseverance) and thrift; the opposite pole of this dimension, short-
term orientation, connotes cultural emphasis on values like personal steadiness and stability and respect 
for tradition. See Tony Fang, A Critique of Hofstede’s Fifth National Culture Dimension, 3 INT’L J. 
CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 347 (2003). 
40. See Chee W. Chow, Paul Harrison, Timothy Lindquist & Anne Wu, Escalating Commitment 














findings on the effect of Hofstede’s cultural uncertainty avoidance,41 which 
tends to be higher in English-speaking countries, on escalation of 
commitment, possibly due to the small sample (two-country) 
comparisons. 42  The latter findings thus confirm that escalation of 
commitment behavior responds to social normative cues, at least informal 
ones, but it appears that they are too preliminary at this stage to offer a clear 
direction for legal policy formation. 
Given that individuals and teams are prone to escalate, the practical 
challenge is to facilitate de-escalation—namely, shutting down the project 
or winding up the firm with a view to salvaging what could be saved. 
According to Chulkov and Barron,  
[r]esearch on the escalation of commitment provides strong support 
for the personal responsibility effect that contributes to escalation as 
long as the original decision makers are involved in the continuation 
of investment decisions. Studies on reversing escalation of 
commitment, or de-escalation, conclude that breaking the cycle of 
escalation decision errors is facilitated by a change in management.43  
Change in management is thus the primary mode of breaking out of the 
escalation trap. Beyond changes in management, additional factors that 
could facilitate de-escalation include, argue Chulkov and Barron, “better 
information on costs and benefits of the project, regular evaluation and 
monitoring of projects, clear criteria for success and minimum target 
performance levels,” and “clear feedback about underperforming 
projects.”44 Such measures will have limited efficacy, however, as long as 
the information they generate is interpreted and acted on by decision-makers 
who have initiated the failing project and even by different persons who are 
nonetheless related to those decision-makers.45 Change in management is 
 
41. Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance refers to feeling uncomfortable or comfortable with 
uncertainty and ambiguity and therefore valuing or devaluing beliefs and institutions that provide 
certainty and conformity. 
42. For different findings, see Mark Keil, Richard Mixon, Timo Saarinen & Virpi Tuunainen, 
Understanding Runaway Information Technology Projects: Results from an International Research 
Program Based on Escalation Theory, 11 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 65 (1994/1995); Mark Keil, Bernard 
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on Escalation of Commitment Behavior in Software Projects, 24 MIS Q. 299 (2000); Charles R. Greer 
& Gregory K. Stephens, Escalation of Commitment: A Comparison of Differences Between Mexican 
and U.S. Decision-Makers, 27 J. MGMT. 51 (2001).  
43. Dmitriy V. Chulkov & John M. Barron, Turnover in Top Management and De-Escalation of 
Commitment, 51 APPLIED ECON. 2534, 2534–35 (2019) (citing studies). 
44. Id. at 2538 (citing studies).  
45. See Brian C. Gunia, Niro Sivanathan & Adam D. Galinsky, Vicarious Entrapment: Your 
Sunk Costs, My Escalation of Commitment, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1238 (2009); see also 
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therefore not only primary; it is essential. Without explicitly referring to 
escalation of commitment, the Supreme Court of New Zealand recently 
recognized the danger that it poses and insisted on the need to address it by 
changing the makeup of the decision-making body in the company: 
The removal of decision-making powers from directors in such 
circumstances is a recognition that directors are not the appropriate 
decision-makers in times of insolvency or near-insolvency. This is 
because their decisions may be compromised by conflicting interests 
and, even where that is not the case, they may be too close to the 
company and its business to be able to take a realistic and impartial 
view of the company’s situation.46  
All of the formal mechanisms have carefully worked out processes for 
decision-making and involve either an independent person or consultation 
with all affected creditors. None of these formal regimes involve continued 
unfettered decision-making by directors. Rather, “[d]irectors can choose to 
employ informal mechanisms but these must align with formal 
mechanisms.”47 
III. CUSTODIAL DUTIES IN THE VICINITY OF INSOLVENCY 
This Part presents a framework for conceptualizing legal responses to 
virtual or liminal insolvency; namely, when firm failure is a virtual reality 
or very nearly so absent some radical development. It is submitted that there 
could be a reason in such situations to mandate a change of strategy from 
entrepreneurial to custodial. An entrepreneurial strategy is profit-oriented 
and principally shareholder-focused. In contrast, a custodial strategy could 
involve seeking return on investment but is premised on caution. It 
underscores preservation, protection of existing assets, and loss-
minimization, and is often creditor-focused. The following section reviews 
the custodial duties of trustees and especially their distinctive duty of 
caution. Next, I discuss the implementation of such custodial duties by 
adopting custodial strategies in business firms. 
The analysis in this Part is conceptual and positive, and—in the 
following Part—comparative. I do not make a strong normative claim about 
the desirability of imposing a duty to implement such strategies. Legal 
systems differ on the mode of regulating the zone of insolvency such that 
imposing such a duty might not be compatible with their general approach. 
 
46. Madsen-Ries v. Cooper [2020] NZSC 100, at [43], per Glazebrook J. 













There are sound justifications for doing so, however, in systems that do 
recognize the zone of insolvency as a legally relevant circumstance.  
A. Custodial Duties of Trustees 
While owing a similar duty of undivided loyalty to their beneficiaries, 
trustees and corporate directors differ fundamentally in the nature of their 
core assignment. Conventional trust funds should provide for the needs of 
the beneficiaries, whereas business corporations invest in risky projects with 
inherently uncertain returns. In Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
Chancellor Allen thus contrasted the responsibilities of trustees and 
directors: 
[T]rust law differs from corporate law. In general, the duties of a 
trustee to trust beneficiaries (those of loyalty, good faith, and due 
care), while broadly similar to those of a corporate director to his 
corporation, are different in significant respects. Corporate directors 
. . . will often be required to take risks with the assets they manage. 
Indeed, an unwillingness to take risks prudently is inconsistent with 
the role of a diligent director. The trustees [sic] role is, classically, 
quite different. The role of the trustee is prudently to manage assets 
placed in trust, within the parameters set down in the trust instrument. 
The classic trusteeship is not essentially a risk taking [sic] enterprise, 
but a caretaking one.48 
The content of the trustee’s duty as a caretaker has evolved over 
generations and took its modern shape around the turn of the millennium. 
Historically, during its early stages of development in England between the 
late thirteenth century and early sixteenth century, the trust transformed 
from a purely passive custodial device into a more discretionary instrument 
that authorized and required trustees to manage the trust fund.49 Getzler 
notes that while “active trust management became a structural element of 
the modern trust by the start of the seventeenth century . . . . such active 
duties were not fundamental to the basic function of the trust, which 
remained a custodial device segregating the entrusted assets from creditors 
of the legal owners . . . .”50 Those assets comprised mostly real property, 
which required a limited amount of oversight and active management, and 
trustees were typically friends and members of the family who operated 
 
48. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1148 (Del. 1994) (emphasis added). 
49. See Joshua Getzler, Duty of Care, in BREACH OF TRUST 41, 43 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto-
Sakmann eds., 2002), on which the following draws. 
50. Id. at 44. 












without remuneration for their services. 51  Socioeconomic developments 
primarily during the nineteenth century have changed much of that, 
however. In the latter part of that century, many trust funds included 
financial assets that required management, and trust services by non-
professional solicitors began to emerge. The new circumstances engendered 
concomitant legal developments. 
Two seminal U.K. cases have formed the framework for trustees’ duties 
of investment. In Speight v. Gaunt (1883), the House of Lords held that “as 
a general rule a trustee sufficiently discharges his duty if he takes in 
managing trust affairs all those precautions which an ordinary prudent man 
of business would take in managing similar affairs of his own.”52 Shortly 
thereafter, in Learoyd v. Whiteley (1887), the House of Lords elaborated: 
[A trustee] is not allowed the same discretion in investing the moneys 
of the trust as if he were a person sui juris dealing with his own estate. 
Business men of ordinary prudence may, and frequently do, select 
investments which are more or less of a speculative character; but it 
is the duty of a trustee to confine himself to the class of investments 
which are permitted by the trust, and likewise to avoid all investments 
of that class which are attended with hazard.53 
Speight and Whiteley together stand for two related propositions that 
retain their viability despite substantial developments since they were 
rendered. The first proposition may be called the “prudent person rule”; the 
second, the “no hazard rule.” The prudent person rule sets the benchmark 
for assessing the qualifications required from a reasonable trustee to handle 
a sizeable trust fund. This rule comprises two (again, related) sub-rules—
one addressing her financial proficiency and another one addressing the 
knowhow she is expected to utilize in managing the trust. Much has changed 
with regard to both issues between the late nineteenth century and today. 
The paradigmatic person has changed from the “prudent man (of business),” 
who could be a volunteer family or friend or a remunerated but financially 
amateur professional, into the “prudent investor,” who is versed in and can 
utilize current knowledge in financial economics. Their respective 
knowhow has changed as well—from lay intuitions and familiarity with 
 
51. See id. at 67–71. See generally CHANTAL STEBBINGS, THE PRIVATE TRUSTEE IN VICTORIAN 
ENGLAND (2002). 
52. Speight v. Gaunt (1883) LR 9 App Cas 1 (UKHL) 19 (Lord Blackburn), aff’g  (1883) LR 22 
Ch D 727 (EWCA (Civ)) at 739–40 (Jessel MR) (“[O]n general principles a trustee ought to conduct the 
business of the trust in the same manner that an ordinary prudent man of business would conduct his 
own . . . .”). 













inflexible rules of appointment about permissible investments into Modern 
Portfolio Theory, which calls for using diversification for tailoring different 
risk/return profiles to the needs of the beneficiaries without a priori ruling 
out certain assets as too risky. This massive transformation has now been 
partially codified;54 it is extensively covered in the literature;55 and will not 
occupy us much further. 
The second, the “no hazard rule,” has received relatively lesser attention 
than the prudent man/investor rule has, but it is the one of most interest here. 
Whiteley and the “no hazard rule” it expresses continue to inform 
contemporary trust law. U.K. courts continue to cite Whitely as authority, 
either directly or indirectly, through other seminal cases that rely on it.56 So 
do courts in Australia. 57  Reflecting a similar approach, U.S. trust law 
imposes a duty to exercise caution as part of a larger set of the trustee’s 
custodial obligations “to safeguard, preserve, or protect the trust assets and 
the safety of the principal.”58 The Restatement on Trusts distinguishes this 
duty from the duty to have skill and exercise care:  
In addition to the duty to use care and skill, the trustee must exercise 
the caution of a prudent investor managing similar funds, in similar 
circumstances, for similar purposes . . . . [T]his requirement of 
caution requires the trustee to invest with a view both to safety of the 
capital and to securing a reasonable return.59 
 
54. See, e.g., Trustee Act 2000, c. 29, § 1 (U.K.); Pensions Act 1995, c. 26, § 36 (U.K.); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (AM. L. INST. 2007) (U.S.). With appropriate authorization in 
the trust instrument, modern trustees can employ financial tools that enable them to take on substantial 
risks that are still deemed manageable, provided they are appropriate for the beneficiary. See UNIF. 
PRUDENT INV. ACT § 2 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994) (U.S.) (“The Act impliedly disavows the emphasis 
in older law on avoiding ‘speculative’ or ‘risky’ investments. Low levels of risk may be appropriate in 
some trust settings but inappropriate in others.”). 
55. See, e.g., J.E. PENNER & JEREMIAH LAU, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 10.12–10.16 (11th ed., 
2019); GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY & TRUSTS 373–400 (3d ed. 2018); Robert H. 
Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 41 (Evan 
J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019). The challenge facing contemporary trustees 
in light of Modern Portfolio Theory is wittily captured in Tony Molloy, I Am a Trustee. I Can’t Make 
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σ√t. Am I at Risk?, 15 TRS. & TRS. 524 (2009). 
56. See Daniel v. Tee [2016] EWHC (Ch) 1538, [38]–[40], 4 WLR 115 (citing Nestle v. Nat’l 
Westminster Bank plc [1993] 1 WLR 1260, 1267); Charity Comm’n for Eng. and Wales v. Mountstar 
(PTC) Ltd [2016] EWHC (Ch) 876, [53], 3 WLR 218; Indep. Tr. Serv. Ltd v. GP Noble Trs. Ltd [2010] 
EWHC (Ch) 1653, [54], All ER (D) 54 (citing Cowan v. Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750, 762). 
57. See Elder’s Tr & Ex’r Co Ltd v Higgins [1963] HCA 48, [29]. 
58. 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 402 (2021) (footnotes omitted). 
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2007); see also id. § 77 (a 
trustee must exercise “reasonable care, skill, and caution.”). Note that “the duty of caution does not call 
for avoidance of risk by trustees but for their prudent management of risk. . . . [A]lthough an inferred, 












This duty of caution, “to avoid all investments . . . which are attended 
with hazard” as Whiteley put it,60 is unique to trustees, distinguishing them 
from corporate directors. This obligation defines trustees as caretakers, 
whereas directors are business managers. While both actors control other 
people’s assets with a view to generating income, there is a fundamental 
difference between their core missions. In managing the trust fund, trustees 
must exercise substantive care; they must take reasonable precautions to 
avoid loss, especially capital loss, although they need not and cannot insure 
against such loss. Diversification is the primary tool with which trustees are 
expected to achieve this goal. In contrast, genuine business managers 
engage in entrepreneurship. They seek to capitalize on uncertainty inherent 
in unique ideas, combinations, and opportunities. 61  Conservatism or 
caution, including by way of risk-reducing diversification, are anathema to 
entrepreneurship and therefore to business management. 62  Shareholders 
should expect (and cannot complain, legally) that directors invest all of the 
company’s resources in a single idiosyncratic venture with highly uncertain 
returns. In line with this basic difference in their core missions, judicial 
review of trustee care and of directors’ care also differs. Managerial 
discretion of trustees is subject to substantive judicial review akin to 
implementing the duty of care of other professionals. 63  In contrast, the 
exercise of discretion in business should be reviewed with respect to its 
 
general duty to invest conservatively is a traditional and accepted feature of trust law, that duty is 
necessarily imprecise in its requirements and is applied with considerable flexibility.” Id. § 90 cmt. e(1). 
60. Learoyd v. Whiteley (1887) 12 App Cas 727 (UHKL) 733 (Lord Watson). 
61. For canonical expositions of these ideas see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Redvers Opie trans., Transaction Publishers 1983) (1911); ISRAEL M. 
KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE 
CAPITALIST PROCESS (1985); see also Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive 
Market Process: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 60 (1997). “Uncertainty” is used here in its 
pure Knightian meaning. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921). I develop 
these points in more detail in Amir N. Licht, The Name of the Rose: Precautions and Business Judgment 
of Company Officers, 19 ISRAEL J.L. & BUS. 536 (2015) (in Hebrew). 
62. This does not relieve corporate directors from the responsibility to manage risks that are 
foreseeable and avoidable as part of their duty of oversight, which is analogous to trustees’ duty to 
protect the fund from external threats. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. 
Ch. 1996).  In tandem, note that with appropriate authorizing provisions in the settlement deed, trusts 
today may be used for conducting regular business activities. The present analysis thus focuses on more 
traditional wealth management trusts.  
63. The key feature of substantive judicial review of decisions made by professionals who handle 
risky situations—medical doctors come to mind—is that there exist conventions and accepted practices 
for addressing particular circumstances in light of their known risk parameters. Medical treatment may 
entail taking risks and could end in failure but is nonetheless based on protocols and procedures that 
have been vetted by experts. Failing to take such measures thus could be deemed unreasonable and thus 













process under the business judgment rule, leaving the substantive decision 
essentially immune.64 
B. Caution and De-escalation in the Vicinity 
The review of escalation of commitment provided in the preceding Part 
reveals a powerful, tenacious factor that bears directly on the vicinity of 
insolvency conundrum. The currently dominant account of risk shifting is 
premised on rational responses to economic incentives. One must never 
underestimate the potency of economic incentives for opportunistic 
behavior, and the present paper does not purport to do so. Opportunistic risk 
shifting thus remains a relevant consideration for legal policy design, but as 
noted, the evidence suggests that its severity should not be overstated.65 It 
is an elegant theory with thus far little evidence to support it. Crucially, risk 
shifting differs from escalation of commitment in that the former is more 
susceptible to market discipline and to self-regulation by contract, even if 
not perfectly so, as the available empirical evidence indeed suggests.66 The 
need for legal intervention is therefore more limited: primarily to situations 
in which creditors cannot reasonably fend for themselves (e.g., tort 
creditors).  
Escalation of commitment, in contrast, being largely detached from 
rational calculations, presents a more compelling justification for legal 
regulation—and a more interventionist one, at that. In this view, 
managers—especially owner-managers—of virtually insolvent firms may 
not enjoy the usual level of deference that the law affords to their business 
judgment in regular times, as their discretion at that point is prone to be 
clouded by a misplaced motivation to stay the course, weather the storm, 
and similarly-spirited no-quitting notions. Optimal law for situations of 
liminal insolvency consequently may need to mandate a change of course, 
order entering into a safe harbor, require a change of the people at the helm, 
or, eventually, call for docking the enterprise. If water is flooding the ship, 
threatening to sink it, its captains should focus on stabilizing it, or finding a 
shelter, or handing over the helm to somebody else, rather than on breaking 
 
64. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 655–
57 (2004); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“‘[S]ubstantive due care’. . . [is] a concept 
[that] is foreign to the business judgment rule. . . . Due care in the decisionmaking context is process 
due care only.”). The doctrine of waste, which used to be treated as a substantive exception to the 
business judgment rule, is now more accurately conceptualized as the doctrine of fiduciary duty of 
loyalty. See SEPTA v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 10374–VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *1, *48 n.114 (Del. 
Ch., 2015), aff’d, 132 A.3d 1 (Del. 2016). 
65. See supra note 10. 
66. See supra note 7. 












speed records—even if that was the original purpose of the voyage. Current 
knowledge about escalation of commitment supports concerns that these 
captains likely will fail to do so on their own volition such that there could 
be a need to force them to do that. 
Adopting a duty of caution by analogy from trust law can provide a 
framework for regulating the conduct of corporate fiduciaries in liminal 
insolvency situations in legal systems that wish to impose special rules for 
such circumstances. When this duty is triggered, directors should change 
their management strategy from entrepreneurial to custodial and operate as 
caretakers for the firm. This change of strategy would discharge the duty to 
consider creditors’ interests that some legal systems impose. Creditors’ only 
legitimate interest is in having their debts serviced, and—in the vicinity of 
insolvency—in preserving the value of the debt. Sometimes this could mean 
ceasing trading immediately; in other cases, this could mean continuing 
trading while incurring new debts. New and even higher indebtedness in 
and as of itself is not necessarily in conflict with creditors’ interest. The 
crucial issue is whether the strategy that guides the firm addresses their 
interest. A custodial duty of caution does exactly that, as it focuses on 
preserving a source of income over a long period while seeking to maximize 
its value subject to this overriding constraint. 
Importantly, a duty of caution in the vicinity of insolvency is not inimical 
to shareholders’ interests either, at least insofar as shareholders care about 
the viability of the firm and are not agnostic to its collapse (e.g., if they are 
highly diversified). For many entrepreneurs and certainly for many owner-
managers of small companies, such an attitude seems at least as plausible as 
the wild “bet the farm” scenario that informs the common economic account 
of asset substitution (and is not baseless itself). 67  When escalation of 
commitment is factored into the analysis, a duty of caution makes even 
greater sense, as it forces managers to pull the plug on the entrepreneurial 
project, they have been committed to but is now failing. Without a clear 
change in the content meaning of directors’ responsibility for corporate 
strategy—namely, what they expected to do in a given setting or their “job 
description”—there is only little hope that calls for a “rescue culture” would 
engender actual rescues of distressed firms. 
Accepting in principle that there is room for a duty of caution in the 
vicinity of insolvency, several secondary issues then arise. First, should the 
custodial caretaking strategy replace the entrepreneurial strategy of business 
of regular times, or should it guide directors in tandem with the latter? This 
 
67. “Bet the farm” is an informal phrase describing a very high stake, often desperate, gamble 













question is equivalent to asking whether directors should focus only on 
creditors’ or on shareholders’ interests or should they balance the interests 
of these two constituencies somehow. Framing the question as one of 
business strategy and a concomitant legal obligation points, I believe, to the 
dichotomous approach as the preferred one. Creditors’ interest must replace 
shareholders’ interest as the focal object of corporate strategy. One could 
adopt a high- or low-risk entrepreneurial strategy or, similarly, a high- or 
low-risk caretaking strategy, but it is difficult to implement both of them at 
the same time as they seek to achieve incompatible goals. Moreover, 
because judicial review of such strategies differs in fundamental respects, 
as noted above,68 it is hard to see how a “mixed strategy” could be subject 
to a unitary judicial review.69 If I am wrong, however, such that the two 
approaches could be implemented in a mixed mode, there could also be 
room for balancing the interests of shareholders and creditors in the vicinity 
of insolvency. We return to this point in the comparative analysis below. 
Second, at what stage should this duty arise? That is, what degree of 
financial distress short of certain insolvency should enliven the duty? 
Relatedly, what should be the criteria for assessing such distress (e.g., 
balance sheet and/or liquidity solvency), and at what level of confidence 
about such distress should directors decide to shift gears and move into 
protective mode to comply with the duty of caution? In principle, every 
business faces some probability of failure and will occasionally tread into 
the periphery of the zone of insolvency in that insolvency would be a non-
negligible contingency that could nonetheless be avoided with appropriate 
strategic measures. In certain industries, moreover, the probability of failure 
is so substantial that insolvency is more likely than not from the outset. 
Overall, only about half of new small businesses make it beyond the five-
year mark.70 In hi-tech and bio-tech start up projects that are financed by 
venture capital, the company is insolvent by design until a very late stage, 
in which it either succeeds or, more often than not, is wound up and 
liquidated.71  Surely that does not mean that entrepreneurs should avoid 
 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
69. Recall that entrepreneurial business management enjoys the protection of (essentially, 
immunity under) the business judge rule, whereas custodial, caretaking, and trustee management is 
subject to substantive judicial review. 
70. High likelihoods of failure of new startup businesses characterize both high-tech and low-
tech ventures. On the bright side, it is a myth that most restaurants fail in their first year. See Tian Luo 
& Philip B. Stark, Nine out of 10 Restaurants Fail? Check, Please,  SIGNIFICANCE, Apr. 2015, 25, 28; 
Kristin Pryor, Here Are the Startup Failure Rates by Industry, TECH.CO (Jan. 12, 2016, 9:00 AM), 
https://tech.co/news/startup-failure-rates-industry-2016-01 [https://perma.cc/5PV 4-H367]. 
71. Venture capital firms are not immune to escalation of commitment. See Devigne, supra note 
27. 












starting new businesses in those industries in general or shut down the 
business when it reaches its half-life while still buoyant. Moreover, shifting 
to custodial creditor-oriented strategy is a major decision that cannot be 
taken lightly nor easily reversed. Effecting such a strategic move does not 
operate on a gradient. Rather, it is a binary shift akin to changing the firm’s 
main business model (e.g., from making widgets to servicing them) and 
probably even more profound.72 Bearing in mind that coping with financial 
distress does not in and of itself justify abandoning the entrepreneurial 
strategy, it seems that a duty of caution should be triggered only at a very 
late stage, in liminal insolvency (or any synonym with an equivalent 
effect)—namely, at the very edge of the zone of insolvency close to 
insolvency, not in the penumbra of the zone. But, again, this is a point on 
which legal minds can differ and has been subject to extensive judicial 
analysis without a clear conclusion thus far, as the comparative analysis 
below indicates. 
A third issue concerns the persons who should implement the custodial 
strategy under the duty of caution. Here, a broad menu of approaches is 
available. At one end, the law could entrust the caretaking responsibility 
with the directors who have been running the firm until that point, in line 
with the U.S. DIP mechanism, which leaves the directors of a bankrupt firm 
in place. A large literature discusses the DIP mechanism as a means to 
facilitate restructuring of struggling companies, but the empirical evidence 
about its effectiveness is equivocal.73 From an escalation-of-commitment 
perspective, however, there is reason to doubt that DIP could be effective 
notwithstanding other considerations such as the desire to avoid over 
deterrence of managers.74 Legal policy that takes escalation of commitment 
into account would rather strive to replace the existing managers with ones 
who are not committed to the failing project or could at least reinvigorate 
the incumbent management team. Appointing an external advisor to the top 
management team on behalf of creditors—especially one whose advice is 
 
72. I am grateful to Aidan Browoleit for helping clarify this point. As a practical matter, 
managers would want to document their deliberations over assessing the situation and their eventual 
decision in order to demonstrate how they discharged their duties, should failure occur and judicial 
review follow. 
73. This literature is beside the present scope. For empirical studies see, for example, Barry E. 
Adler, Vedran Capkun & Lawrence A. Weiss, Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 11, 29 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 461 (2013); Avner Kalay, Rajeev Singhal & Elizabeth Tashjian, Is Chapter 11 Costly?, 
84 J. FIN. ECON. 772 (2007); Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 
Liquidation Versus Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253 (2006). 
74. See Adler et al., supra note 73 (arguing that managers’ influence over the decision to file a 













like a command like a Chief Restructuring Officer (“CRO”) —could 
provide a compromise solution.75 
Legal policy for the zone of insolvency is less clear, however. On the 
one hand, the firm is not yet bankrupt and there is still a chance that it could 
trade its way out of financial distress. On the other hand, that chance would 
be maximized if it were exploited by decision makers who are less likely to 
fall prey to escalation of commitment. Crucially, as long as creditors do not 
take over the company through formal insolvency proceedings, the directors 
remain shareholder-appointed and thus harbor allegiance to them regardless 
of formal legal obligations. In smaller firms, shareholders and directors 
often overlap, making it even more challenging to require them to shift (or 
split) their focus to creditors’ interest. As noted above, forced changes in 
the composition of management teams, particularly by adding independent 
professionals, could facilitate de-escalation. 76  A potentially promising 
approach for implementing a custodial duty of caution with extant directors 
thus could compel them to consult with an external expert, especially with 
regard to restructuring, akin to a CRO. Such an expert could more 
effectively cause the directors to acknowledge reality and de-escalate by 
shifting to a caretaking strategy with the hope to resume entrepreneurial 
business in the future. 
IV. CARING FOR CREDITORS ACROSS COUNTRIES 
Legal systems around the world exhibit significant variation with regard 
to directors’ duties to protect creditors’ interests, especially when the 
company is nearing insolvency and in particular, when the company appears 
to be doomed for insolvency. Legal approaches run the gamut from denying 
all protection beyond those provided by contract to fully equalizing the 
status of creditors to that of shareholders and other stakeholders. When law 
leverages fiduciary duties for the protection of creditors in such 
circumstances, these duties vary from a strict injunction to file for 
bankruptcy to a requirement to endeavor to minimize creditors’ losses to a 
vague duty to consider creditors’ interest.77  This Part reviews a sample of 
 
75. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006). 
76. See supra text accompanying note 30–31.  
77. In considering this menu, one should also keep in mind other bankruptcy doctrines. 
Bankruptcy laws are part and parcel of every corporate governance system such that there cannot be a 
clear-cut distinction between them and fiduciary duties, for instance. On such “insolvencification” of 
corporate governance in the European Union, see Martin Gelter, Centros and Defensive Regulatory 
Competition: Some Thoughts and a Glimpse at the Data, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 467 (2019); Marek 
Szydło, Directors’ Duties and Liability in Insolvency and the Freedom of Establishment of Companies 












such approaches from common law jurisdictions and examines the extent to 
which they could harness a custodial duty of caution to address the 
escalation of commitment problem. First, the two extreme positions in the 
United States and Canada are noted. Next, I proceed to more nuanced 
versions found in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.  
A. The United States 
U.S. law—at least Delaware law—endorses the strongest version of 
shareholder primacy. 78  Under current doctrine, only the interest of 
shareholders as a constituent group can be the objective of Delaware 
corporations. According to the seminal decision in Guth v. Loft, “[c]orporate 
officers and directors . . . stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and 
its stockholders.” 79  Repeated in numerous occasions since it was 
formulated, this doctrine was solidified in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark, where the Delaware Chancery Court stated that “[d]irectors of a 
for-profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a rights plan to defend a 
business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization—
at least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware 
law.” 80  Writing extrajudicially, former Delaware Chief Justice Strine 
argued that “[d]espite attempts to muddy the doctrinal waters, a clear-eyed 
look at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within the limits of 
their discretion, directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end, and 
 
after Kornhaas, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1853 (2017); Wolf-Georg Ringe, Kornhaas and the 
Challenge of Applying Keck in Establishment, 42 EUR. L. REV. 270 (2017); Luca Enriques & Martin 
Gelter, How the Old World Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in 
European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, 81 TUL. L. REV. 577 (2007). 
78. I refer here to Delaware’s general corporate law. The legal landscape in the United States is 
broader and more varied, but not in a way that affects the present analysis. Delaware and several other 
states have special statutes on “benefit corporations,” and forty-one U.S. states (but not Delaware) have 
adopted “corporate constituency statutes” or “stakeholder laws.” Joseph R. Shealy, The Corporate 
Identity Theory Dilemma: North Carolina and the Need for Constructionist Corporate Law Reform, 94 
N.C. L. REV. 686, 691 (2016) (citing Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond 
Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 833 (2003)). See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate 
Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227 (2004); Brett 
McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (The Existential Failing of Delaware), 
39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263 (2016); David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the 
Public Benefit Corporation Trivial, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461 (2017). 
79. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 
(Del. 1998) (citing Guth, 5 A.2d at 510) (“The directors of Delaware corporations stand in a fiduciary 
relationship not only to the stockholders but also to the corporations upon whose boards they serve.”). 













that other interests may be taken into consideration only as a means of 
promoting stockholder welfare.”81 
Guth is uniquely shareholder focused in two respects. First, it refers to 
shareholders as direct beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties, in parallel 
with the corporation, and thus seemingly bypasses the latter’s separate legal 
personality. Second, Guth considers the interests of the corporation and of 
stockholders as perfectly overlapping. The upshot is that the interests of all 
other stakeholder groups are necessarily excluded inasmuch as they are not 
aligned with shareholders’ interests or else the directors risk falling into a 
disabling situation akin to a dual-fiduciary situation even if not formally so. 
This logic guided the Delaware Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Gheewalla.82 Prior to Gheewalla, Delaware law held that “upon insolvency, 
the beneficiaries of the directors’ fiduciary duties shifted from the 
corporation’s stockholders to its creditors, and that after insolvency 
directors had a fiduciary obligation to preserve value for the benefit of 
creditors”—a “trust fund doctrine [that] would resemble English law.”83 
This doctrine “included an obligation to manage the corporation 
conservatively.”84 Then there followed a period of legal ambiguity due to 
Chancellor Allen’s famous dictum in Credit Lyonnais, which suggested a 
multiple-stakeholder enterprise approach to directors’ duties in the vicinity 
of insolvency. 85  That dictum engendered much discussion but was 
eventually rejected in Gheewalla: 
 
81. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the 
Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015). Strine was careful to distinguish his understanding of positive doctrine 
from his views on desirable law. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism (Univ. 
of Penn. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019). 
82. N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). 
83. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 172–73 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Quadrant 
I) (Laster, V.C.). For a comprehensive discussion of the trust fund doctrine, see Jared A. Ellias & Robert 
J. Stark, Delaware Corporate Law and the “End of History” in Creditor Protection, in FIDUCIARY 
OBLIGATIONS IN BUSINESS (Arthur Laby & Jacob Russell eds., forthcoming Aug. 2021).  
84. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 545 (Del. Ch. 2015) (Quadrant II) 
(Laster,  V.C.). 
85. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathé Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 
WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). I read the relevant passage in Credit Lyonnais, 
complete with calculations and a table, as stated in obiter. See also Robert  Bartlett & Eric  Talley, Law 
and Corporate Governance (same), in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 177, 196 (Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Weisbach eds., 2017). Finance and accounting 
scholars have nonetheless examined it as if it had changed positive law. The findings are mixed and do 
not lend clear support to the notion that such a (putative) legal changes were beneficial to creditors. See, 
e.g., Bo Becker & Per Strömberg, Fiduciary Duties and Equity-Debtholder Conflicts, 25 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1931 (2012); Shai Levi, Benjamin Segal & Dan Segal, Does Fiduciary Duty to Creditors Reduce 
Debt-Covenant-Violation Avoidance Behavior?, J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. (forthcoming); Jagadison K. Aier, 
Long Chen & Mikhail Pevzner, Debtholders’ Demand for Conservatism: Evidence from Changes in 
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 52 J. ACCT. RSCH. 993 (2014); Daniel Bens, Sterling Huang, Liang Tan & 












When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, 
the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must 
continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best 
interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.86 
Gheewalla is particularly noteworthy because the Court goes to great 
lengths “to provide the directors with clear signal beacons and brightly lined 
channel markers as they navigate with due care, good faith, a loyalty on 
behalf of a Delaware corporation and its shareholders.”87 So much so, that 
by drawing a sharp distinction between solvency and insolvency, it 
effectively denies as a matter of law the existence of a murky zone of 
insolvency, although in reality, vagueness and uncertainty characterize this 
setting.88 Directors of Delaware corporations consequently do not owe an 
obligation to implement a custodial (“conservative”) strategy with a view to 
protecting creditors’ interests, although they may do so with a view to 
promoting shareholders’ interest under the umbrella of the business 
judgment rule. A license to manage cautiously in the vicinity of insolvency, 
as opposed to a duty to do so, obviously is a much weaker protection against 
escalation of commitment. 
B. Canada 
While Delaware law renounces any recognition of nuance and ambiguity 
with regard to pre-insolvency creditor-oriented fiduciary duties, Canadian 
law wholeheartedly embraces ambiguity and uncertainty as it endorses the 
opposite approach. In essence, both Delaware and Canada ignore the 
vicinity of insolvency as a matter of practice, but while Delaware eliminates 
it as a matter of law, Canada comes close to locating every business decision 
in some proximity to insolvency, with concomitant implications for 
directors’ fiduciary duties. The Canada Business Corporations Act 
(“CBCA”) renders the corporation the nominal beneficiary of directors’ and 
officers’ fiduciary duties.89 In tandem, the CBCA’s provision on oppression 
 
Wan Wongsunwai, Contracting and Reporting Conservatism Around a Change in Fiduciary Duties, 37 
CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 2472 (2020). 
86. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101.  
87. Id. (quoting Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998)). 
88. See Quadrant I, 102 A.3d at 174 n.4 (“In Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court discarded 
the zone . . . .”); Quadrant II, 115 A.3d  at 546 (“There is no legally recognized ‘zone of insolvency’ 
with implications for fiduciary duty claims.”); Kirschner v. FitzSimons (In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent 
Conv. Litig.), No. 12-cv-2652, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204632, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) 
(referring to “Gheewalla’s rejection of the ‘zone of insolvency’ theory”). 













enumerates creditors among those entitled to a remedy against oppression.90 
This has led the Supreme Court of Canada to adopt an open-ended 
stakeholderist doctrine. In considering a petition by institutional 
bondholders in BCE, the court held: 
[T]he duty of the directors to act in the best interests of the 
corporation comprehends a duty to treat individual stakeholders 
affected by corporate actions equitably and fairly. There are no 
absolute rules. In each case, the question is whether, in all the 
circumstances, the directors acted in the best interests of the 
corporation, having regard to all relevant considerations, including, 
but not confined to, the need to treat affected stakeholders in a fair 
manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible 
corporate citizen. 
Directors may find themselves in a situation where it is impossible to 
please all stakeholders. . . . There is no principle that one set of 
interests—for example the interests of shareholders—should prevail 
over another set of interests.91 
The BCE court thus put on the table what many have swept under the 
carpet. By using fairness rather than loyalty as the framework of analysis, 
BCE allows for conflicting interests to be balanced against one another. 
However, as the court candidly acknowledges, this ruling gives directors no 
guidance as to how they should resolve this dilemma and in fact notes that 
“the court looks beyond legality to what is fair, given all of the interests at 
play.”92  A 2019 amendment to the CBCA (re-)locates the issue within 
fiduciary duties, as it authorizes directors and officers to consider the 
interests of shareholders, employees, retirees and pensioners, creditors, 
consumers, and governments, the environment, and the long-term interests 
of the corporation.93  Consistent with BCE, this new provision does not 
prioritize any of these interests. It is thus silent about the strategy or mix of 
 
90. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-44 § 241(2). Compare the parallel 
provision on unfair prejudice in section 994 of the Companies Act 2006, c. 46 (U.K.), which does not 
enumerate creditors. A provision inspired by Canada’s oppression section exists in Antigua. 
International Business Corporations Act 1983, c. 222 § 204 (Ant. & Barb.); see In re Stanford Int’l Bank 
Ltd. [2019] UKPC 45 [26]–[27] (appeal taken from Ant. & Barb.). 
91. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, paras. 82–84 (Can.). 
92. Id. at para. 71. 
93. The new section, 122(1.1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, as amended by the 
Budget Implementation Act, S.C. 2019, c 29 § 141 (Can.), resembles Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. 
Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, para. 42 (Can.) (“[I]n determining whether they are acting with a view to the 
best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the 
board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, 
consumers, governments and the environment.”). 












strategies that directors should implement and is agnostic to the vicinity of 
insolvency. 
C. The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand 
The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand present a complex, 
intermediate approach to creditor-oriented fiduciary duties, hereinafter 
referred to as the Anglo approach. Certain elements of this approach have 
evolved by way of cross- fertilization through judicial exchange of ideas 
among these jurisdictions such that despite substantial differences, it 
warrants analysis as a largely single approach.94 The Anglo approach has 
two prongs: first, a common law rule on directors’ duty to consider the 
interest of creditors that is viewed as applying to the vicinity of insolvency; 
second, a statutory provision that in different formulations and titles 
imposes personal liability on directors for failing to take action to protect 
creditors when the company is virtually insolvent. But before we look at 
these rules, a note on the benchmark approach to the objective of the 
company in these jurisdictions. 
Company law in these jurisdictions is more loyal to the classical formula 
of fiduciary loyalty by making the company alone the beneficiary of 
directors’ fiduciary duties. Moreover, it has traditionally taken a 
comprehensive approach to the best interests of the company by referring to 
“the company as a whole.”95 While recognizing shareholders as the ultimate 
arbiters of corporate affairs, this formulation can accommodate different 
stances on who counts for the company’s best interests. The U.K. 
Companies Act 2006 preserves this approach.96 Section 172 of the Act is 
explicit in designating shareholders as the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
company’s business.97 In tandem, this section requires directors to consider 
other stakeholders, yet stakeholders’ interests are subordinated to the 
interests of shareholders. 98  Corporation statutes in Australia and New 
 
94. Certain elements of the Anglo approach can also be found in Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Israel but will not be discussed here. 
95. See Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd. [1951] Ch 286, 291 (Eng.); Allen v. Gold Reefs of 
W. Afr. Ltd. [1900] 1 Ch 656, 671 (Eng.).  
96. Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 170(1) (U.K.). 
97. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 172(1) (U.K.) (stating that “[a] director of a company must 
act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— [. . 
.]”). 
98. See, e.g., Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the 
United Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach,’ 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577 (2007); 













Zealand do not have parallel provisions beyond the general fiduciary duty 
to manage the company in good faith, such that this point is governed by 
traditional common law.99 
Against this backdrop, courts in these jurisdictions have developed a 
doctrine that requires directors to consider the interests of creditors, 
especially in the vicinity of insolvency. At a fundamental level, English law 
has long viewed the interest of creditors as limiting shareholders’ 
sovereignty over the company and, hence, also directors’ duty to manage it 
for their benefit. According to the famous In re Duomatic decision, the 
fully-informed unanimous consent of all shareholders can approve any 
breach of fiduciary duty, but that power is qualified so that such an action 
cannot harm creditors’ interest.100 In tandem, a more focused line of cases 
has developed a particular duty to consider creditors’ interest.101 According 
to standard historiography of this “consider thy creditor” doctrine,102 its 
early pronouncements emerged in Australia and New Zealand. 103  In 
Nicholson v. Permakraft, Judge Cooke said:  
The duties of directors are owed to the company. On the facts of 
particular cases this may require the directors to consider inter alia 
 
in SHAPING THE CORPORATE LANDSCAPE: TOWARDS CORPORATE REFORM AND ENTERPRISE 
DIVERSITY 131 (Nina Boeger & Charlotte Villiers eds., 2018). 
99. For Australia see Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 181 (Austl.); Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 
90 CLR 425, 438 (Austl.) (citing Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd. [1951] Ch 286 (Eng.)). See 
generally Rosemary Teele Langford, Best Interests: Multifaceted but Not Unbounded, 75 CAMB. L.J. 
505 (2016). For New Zealand, see Companies Act 1983, s 131 (N.Z.). See generally JOHN FARRAR & 
SUSAN WATSON, COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 368 (2d ed. 2013). 
100. See In re Duomatic Ltd. [1969] 2 Ch 365 at 373 (U.K.) (“[W]here it can be shown that all 
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matter which a general meeting of the company could carry into effect, that assent is as binding as a 
resolution in general meeting would be.”); see also In re Horsley & Weight [1982] Ch 442 at 454–56 
(U.K.). For a recent restatement in the Privy Council, see Ciban Management Corp. v. Citco (BVI) Ltd 
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that the transaction must not jeopardise the company’s solvency or cause loss to its creditors . . . .”). An 
early pronouncement of this approach appeared already in Attorney General for Canada v. Standard 
Trust Co. of New York [1911] UKPC 37, AC 498 at 505;  (Eng.). In Australia and New Zealand, see, 
respectively, Links Golf Tasmania Pty Ltd v Sattler (2012) 213 FCR 1, ¶583 (Austl.); Westpac Sec. Ltd 
v. Kensington [1994] 2 NZLR 555. 
101. The two doctrinal strands have now intermingled. See, e.g., Bowthorpe Holdings Ltd. v. Hills 
[2002] EWHC 2331 (Ch), All ER (D) 112 (Eng.); Madoff Sec. Int’l Ltd v. Raven [2011] EWHC 3102 
(Comm), [2012] All ER (Comm) 634 (U.K.). 
102. See Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties and Creditors’ Interests, 130 L.Q. REV. 443 (2014) 
[hereinafter Keay, Directors’ Duties]; see also Andrew Keay, Formulating a Framework for Directors’ 
Duties to Creditors: An Entity Maximisation Approach, 64 CAMB. L.J. 614 (2005); Anil Hargovan & 
Jason Harris, For Whom the Bell Tolls: Directors’ Duties to Creditors After Bell, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 
433 (2013); Langford, supra note 99.  
103. See Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1 (Austl.); Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd. 
[1985] 1 NZLR 242 (CA). 












the interests of creditors. For instance creditors are entitled to 
consideration, in my opinion, if the company is insolvent, or near-
insolvent, or of doubtful solvency, or if a contemplated payment or 
other course of action would jeopardise its solvency.104 
This idea gained momentum in the Australian case of Kinsela v. Russell 
Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq).105 Kinsela was subsequently adopted in the English 
Liquidators of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd. 106  The U.K. 
Companies Act now codifies this obligation in section 172(3). In English 
law, West Mercia spawned a whole body of case law, the content and 
contours of which are extensively debated.107  Keay, among others, has 
pointed out the fuzziness of this doctrine, especially with regard to the stage 
at which the duty to consider creditors’ interests is triggered, and, crucially, 
whether this duty, when it arises, operates in lieu of or in tandem with the 
duty to focus on shareholders’ interests, i.e., whether creditors’ interest 
becomes paramount to shareholders’ interests or not.108 The latter point goes 
to the heart of conceptualizing the purpose of the company as monist or a 
pluralist. Recent court of appeals decisions in several jurisdictions have 
adopted different views about this point such that it is anything but 
settled.109 
What has been largely neglected in this judicial and academic discourse 
is the manner in which directors are to consider creditors’ interest if they 
 
104. Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd., [1985] 1 NZLR at 249 (CA). 
105. (1986) 4 NSWLR 722 (Austl.); see also Spies v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603 (Austl.). 
106. (1988) 4 BCC 30 (U.K.). 
107. For a piercing critique of the basic doctrine see K.M. Hayne, Directors’ Duties and a 
Company’s Creditors, 38 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 795 (2014). Van Zwieten argues that the rule in West 
Mercia has been applied in conventional circumstances of unlawful preferences or breach of fiduciary 
duties. See Kristin van Zwieten, Director Liability in Insolvency and Its Vicinity, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 382 (2018). For a discussion, see Andrew Keay, Financially Distressed Companies, Preferential 
Payments and the Director’s Duty to Take Account of Creditors’ Interests, 136 L.Q. REV. 52 (2020). 
108. See Keay, Directors’ Duties, supra note 102, for a comprehensive review of authorities; see 
also Andrew Keay, Financially Distressed Companies, Restructuring and Creditors’ Interests: What Is 
a Director to Do?, 2019 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 297. 
109. See BTI 2014 LLC v. Sequana S.A. [2019] EWCA (Civ) 112 [222] (U.K.) (“[I]t is hard to 
see that creditors’ interests could be anything but paramount.”); Cooper v. Debut Homes Ltd. (in liq.) 
[2019] NZCA 39 at [26] (N.Z.) (“When a company is nearing insolvency, the interests of the company 
extends to encompass the interests of the company’s creditors.”); Westpac Banking Corp. v Bell Group 
Ltd. (in liq.) [No. 3] [2012] WASCA 157, 520 (Austl.) (“[D]irectors in discharging their fiduciary duties 
to their company must, if the company is sufficiently financially distressed, have regard and give proper 
effect to the interests of creditors.”); Moulin Glob. Eyecare Holdings Ltd. v. Mei, [2014] 17 
H.K.C.F.A.R. 466, 485, 489–490 (C.F.I.)(H.K.). For a review of the law post-Sequana see Rosemary 
Teele Langford & Ian Ramsay, The “Creditors’ Interests Duty”: When Does It Arise and What Does It 
Require?, 135 L.Q. REV. 385 (2019). As of this writing, Sequana is under appeal to the U.K. Supreme 
Court. The decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Cooper was reversed by the New Zealand 
Supreme Court but not with regard to the point made in the above quote. See Madsen-Ries v. Cooper 













are to do more than merely give their mind to it, keep calm, and carry on. It 
is submitted that when this duty is enlivened, directors should shift 
corporate strategy to “survival mode” —that is, abandon any entrepreneurial 
strategy the company may have been pursuing and implement a custodial, 
caretaking strategy with a view to protecting the company’s core strategic 
assets. Such a strategy need not be similar to strategies that a liquidator 
could implement in order to sell the firm as a going concern.110 According 
to the present analysis, the purpose of such a creditor-considering duty is to 
help directors break out of the escalation of commitment trap by forcing a 
reconsideration of the business strategy in light of current circumstances. 
The purpose is not to make the company a “dead man walking”—namely, 
a not-yet-in-bankruptcy insolvent company that is nonetheless heading for 
bankruptcy. As long as the directors believe that there is a viable business 
strategy for the company, with creditors’ interest taken into account, they 
should be allowed to pursue it. Their discretion, however, may not be 
shielded by the protection of the business judgment rule. As argued above, 
when directors operate in the vicinity of insolvency, narrowly interpreted, 
they should become subject to a duty of caution or a close equivalent to that 
duty. Unlike the duty of care under the business judgment rule, the duty of 
caution is subject to substantive judicial review and intervention. Dicta in 
several cases are consistent with this view.111 
The second prong in the Anglo approach comprises statutory provisions 
that impose liability on directors of nearly, virtually, or practically insolvent 
companies for failing to take action in order to minimize the loss to 
creditors. Known as wrongful trading in British parlance, these statutes 
come under different titles and in different textual formulations.112 Their 
underlying logic has been contested and their track record in terms of 
achieving their purpose is subject to extensive debates, the discussion of 
which exceeds the present scope.113 It would not be an exaggeration to say 
 
110. See Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Ltd. v. Mei [2014] 17 H.K.C.F.A.R. at 489 (C.F.I.)  
(“The duty may extend to not prejudicing the interests of creditors and preserving the assets of the 
company so that those assets may be dealt with in accordance with ordinary principles of insolvency law 
. . . .”). 
111. See, e.g., Westpac Banking Corp v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No. 3] [2012] WASCA 157, 520 
(Austl.) (“[C]ourts will now intervene in an appropriate case, irrespective of the directors’ beliefs and 
business judgments, to ensure that creditors are properly protected.”). 
112. See Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45 §§ 214, 246ZB (U.K.) (wrongful trading); Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) ss 588G–588GA (Austl.) (insolvent trading); Companies Act 1993, ss 135–36 (N.Z.) 
(reckless trading). 
113. For scholarly analyses see, for example, Paul Davies, Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duties 
in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 301 
(2006); Andrew Keay, Wrongful Trading: Problems and Proposals, 65 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 63 (2014); 
Jason Harris, Director Liability for Insolvent Trading: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, 23 AUSTL. 












that these are the statutes that everybody loves to hate. So much so, that 
when the Covid-19 pandemic hit the world in 2020, the governments in the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand passed laws to suspend these 
provisions for periods of several months—a move that is somewhat 
perplexing when one recalls that other sources of director liability, including 
the duty to consider creditors’ interest, remain intact.114 
The theory advanced in this paper could help in rationalizing wrongful 
trading statutes. In this view, liability for wrongful trading should not aim 
to provide creditors with a direct cause of action against directors for the 
former’s losses; neither should it be viewed as a deterrent against taking 
excessive risks (“gambles”) with a view to shifting risk to creditors. An 
equally plausible rationale for these laws is to prod directors out of the 
escalation of commitment corral. This is particularly salient with regard to 
the Australian insolvent trading provision, to which a 2017 amendment 
added a set of safe harbors for directors that includes obtaining appropriate 
advice, keeping themselves informed of the financial position of the 
company, and maintaining proper financial records.115 These steps echo the 
mechanisms suggested in the escalation-of-commitment literature as means 
for de-escalation. They thus support an interpretation and implementation 
of the Australian statute, and possibly also its counterparts, as intended for 
achieving this goal.  
Stated otherwise, wrongful trading liability could be imposed in legal 
systems that recognize this type of liability for failing to endeavor to replace 
an entrepreneurial strategy with a custodial strategy. It would not be 
imposed if directors took steps to address the situation. Despite textual 
challenges in the wording of those provisions, such liability could be 
assessed like a breach of trustees’ duty of caution and, consequently, 
without the immunity of the business judgment rule. Denying directors of 
the business judgment rule protection does not render wrongful trading 
liability strict, however. Like trustees, directors can still show that they 
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acted in good faith and reasonably in the circumstances, but their decisions 
would be subject to substantive judicial review.116 Much depends on courts’ 
understanding of the conundrum faced by managers of financially distressed 
companies. Judicial statements in this regard provide some comfort. In 
Singer v. Beckett (In re Continental Assurance Co of London PLC), Judge 
Park famously said that “[c]easing to trade and liquidating too soon can be 
stigmatised as the coward’s way out.”117 In Cooper, the Court of Appeal of 
New Zealand recently confirmed that “[d]irectors do not become liable 
under [section 135] simply because they continue trading after a company 
becomes insolvent.”118 
Finally, the present theory could also provide a justification for the 
suspension of wrongful trading liability for a limited period after the 
outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic exerted a systemic shock 
to entire economies, the features of which could not have been foreseen. 
Inasmuch as financial distress and subsequent insolvency are related to the 
pandemic, there is scant basis to assume that they could have been avoided 
but for escalation of commitment by corporate leaders and their failure to 
de-escalate. The same cannot be said about the rationale from shifting risk, 
which is theoretically applicable also amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.119  
CONCLUSION 
The legal zone in the vicinity of insolvency has attracted much attention 
from scholars and judges alike. That this zone exists as a matter of business 
reality cannot be denied. Many firms experience financial distress at certain 
stages of their operations; some overcome it and some don’t. Whether the 
condition of close proximity to insolvency should change the legal regime 
that applies to directors has received very different answers across common 
law jurisdictions, however. This paper advances a new account for 
motivating special legal treatment of fiduciary duties in the vicinity of 
 
116. See supra note 63 with respect to substantive judicial review of professionals who handle 
risky situations. Arguably, there is a similar expertise in handling financially distressed firms that 
addresses protecting key assets, for instance—e.g., intellectual property or crucial locations—relieving 
debt burden, etc.  
117. Singer v. Beckett (In re Continental Assurance Co. of London PLC) [2007] 2 BCLC 287 (Ch 
D) at [281] (Eng.). 
118. Cooper v. Debut Homes Ltd. (in liq.) [2019] NZCA 39 at [31] (N.Z.). See supra note 109. 
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broader argument that bankruptcy proceedings are inappropriate for resolving Covid-19-related 
insolvencies, see Kristin van Zwieten, Horst Eidenmüller & Oren Sussman, Bail-Outs and Bail-Ins Are 
Better than Bankruptcy: A Comparative Assessment of Public Policy Responses to COVID-19 Distress, 
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insolvency, in addition to the conventional account of risk shifting. This 
account points to escalation of commitment to motivate the imposition of a 
custodial duty of caution in the vicinity of insolvency. The analytical 
framework advanced in this Article can help in clarifying the law on this 
difficult subject. 
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